effects of any decisions we make. The critical decisions we make on how to proceed can mean the difference in contractors being force multipliers or detractors, and could tip the scales in favor of the enemy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
INTRODUCTION
The defense force of the United States has undergone a significant reduction since Desert Storm, and projected budget dollars promise further reductions for the next several years.
Further, our military forces and operations are changing dramatically in response to the changing security environment and advances in technology.
Although the goal of the National Security Strategy of the United States is to shape the international environment, it recognizes that shaping efforts alone will not guarantee the international environment we seek. Our changing and dynamic global environment requires that we .continue to maintain a strong military force in support of our national security strategy of engagement as we approach the 21st Century. According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), we will be able to execute the full spectrum of military operations, from deterring an adversary's aggression or coercion in crisis and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars. This is a tall order, and is exacerbated by declining resources. The QDR's approach is to trim current forcesprimarily in the "tail" (support structure), and only slightly in the "tooth" (combat structure). This mandate not only changes the way we fight, but extends those changes to the way we support the warfighter. The forces envisioned in Joint Vision 2010 will \ require a radically different support structure, as well as some important and innovative decisions to offset the steadily increasing investments we must make to serve the warfighter.
To decrease our "tooth to tail" ratio, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Army have targeted our ever-increasing support and infrastructure costs historically 3 consuming over half of our defense budgets.
One way to decrease these costs is to employ contractors as force multipliers. This concept is not new, but the extent to which we have used contractors in recent conflicts has increased dramatically. Civilians and contractors represented less than three percent of the total force during the Gulf War, but they 4 now represent nine percent of the Bosnian force.
As we increasingly rely on contracted support as force multipliers, we must develop employment doctrine which supports our National Military Strategy in general and the theater commander's campaign strategy in particular.
Although we have previously used contractors in a rear area support role, what are the implications for taking the next step:
Contractors on the battlefield in forward areas, maintaining key weapon systems?
This next step was proposed in 1997. At that time, the. Army determined that we needed to develop an overarching concept, doctrine, and policy to govern integration of civilian contractors on the battlefield. This paper will examine the concept, what that employment doctrine should be, and the implications for theater commanders of employing contractors on the battlefield as force multipliers.
It will discuss the risks for expanding contractor utilization, and make recommendations on policies and procedures for the future.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT IS KEY
The forces envisioned in Joint Vision 2010 are deployed in accordance with four operational concepts-dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics. personnel.
Therefore, if we must change our logistics and support structure as a result of fewer resources and an expanded mission, whatever changes or decisions we make must be based on acceptable risk and not significantly degrade our capability.
CHANGE BRINGS RISK
When we discuss courses of action, one of the things we often First, we must ensure that any new approach results in no degradation of readiness.
Second, that it works in both peace and war.
Third, that it meets accept applicable statutory requirements.
Fourth, that it provides significant cost savings.
Fifth, that it guarantees a competitive industrial base and vendor base will remain for the future.
Sixth, and perhaps most important, that any new approach is politically sustainable.
Only after satisfying these criteria will we be able to use contractors with acceptable risk.
RISKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMMANDER
There are many risks associated with depending on civilian contractors in a battlefield situation. Some of them affect mission readiness: What are the implications of contractors to readiness evaluated in terms of timing, command and control, and force protection? Can we guarantee that the vendor will be there in times of war? Will a decision to expand the use of contractors as a force multiplier provide a significant cost savings? In the following pages, this author will discuss six of these issues, particularly as they apply to the commander in the joint theater: mission readiness, timing, command and control, discipline, force protection, and resources planning. They are not all encompassing. Rather, they represent a theater commander's initial concerns.
1. Mission/Readiness.
Walker stated we must "ensure no degradation of readiness."
We can evaluate readiness in a variety of ways.
Commitment to the Mission
An advantage of using a contractor is that it allows military personnel to focus on the mission, since civilians provide support functions. However, one of the basic differences between contractors and soldiers is their dedication to the Mission Essential Services. Implications of using systems contractors in war as we do in peace means that their services will be mission essential. Although the DA policy states unequivocally that contractors will not replace force structure, the reality is that if the capability is not in our force structure during peacetime, it will probably not be there in wartime. This opens two areas of risk. What if contractors choose to leave when a conflict intensifies? Also, can noncombatants legally stay in the conflict zone when conflicts escalate?
Contractors providing services designated as essential are expected to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract, during periods of crisis until appropriately released or evacuated by military authority.
Even if a contract calls for employees to stay during a conflict, and the company is liable for that, an employee merely has to resign to relieve himself of that obligation. Finally, as stated earlier, even though the Army can hold the company liable, the employee simply has to submit a resignation.
In effect, warfighting cannot be conducted successfully through legalisms or litigation.
Timing.
The outcome of a given choice can be measured over time.
In order to be successful, and to be effective as a force The newly developed DA Pamphlet 715-XX specifies contractors' pre-deployment activities:
As part of deployment processing for contractor employees, the Individual Deployment Sites (IDS) or CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) will screen contractors' records, conduct theater specific briefings and training, issue theater specific clothing and individual equipment, verify that medical requirements (such as immunization, DNA screening, HIV testing and dental examinations) for deployment have been met, and arrange for transportation to the theater of operations.
The pamphlet also states that the contractor must ensure that his employees receive all required processing information.
Obviously, unless the peacetime contract specifically calls for the contractor's organization to ensure that all deployment information is up-to-date, there will be a delay in their deployment. In an interview, this author asked a former battalion commander in Bosnia that if he were the theater commander, what would be his biggest concern in using contractors? He replied:
Besides force protection, a "We-They" impact on morale and discipline.
Contractors are not in the chain of command, call their own hours, do not have the same pride and commitment to mission accomplishment, will not suffer (may, in fact, avoid) hardships suffered by troops, and have separate R&R policies-creating a natural separation between contractors and soldiers.. Under difficult and dangerous conditions, this gulf can be exaggerated. Also, without supervisory disciplinary responsibility over contractors, commanders are at risk in getting things done, under extreme conditions, that are absolutely mission essential." 4. Discipline.
Military law is set forth in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). Active duty soldiers are subject to the UCMJ at all times, on and off post. However, UCMJ only applies to contractor employees when they are serving with or accompanying an armed force "in time of war." The U.S. Supreme Court has 34 ruled "in time of war" to mean a congressionally declared war.
According to DA Pamphlet 715-XX, the commander has limited discipline leverage on a contractor: Discipline may be conferred on contractor personnel by suspending administrative privileges, but this is for infractions such as making a sale, or purchasing for unauthorized members, of exchange merchandise and services, theft of exchange merchandise, shoplifting, or intention and repeated presentation of dishonored checks or other indebtedness.
The pamphlet does not discuss other forms of discipline.
Nonetheless, discipline is necessary with contractors just as it is with soldiers. On base, contractors should be subject to the same standards of conduct as soldiers. Although these standards can be enforced by the commander on post, off-post activities and/or restrictions will be hard to enforce for contractor personnel. One commander reported:
If I had a problem with a contractor, the chain of discipline went to their supervisor.
As base commander, I felt I had responsibility for their behavior and the authority to report problems and demand removal/replacement. This only surfaced once in eleven months: a contractor sexually harassed a female MP; supervisors immediately reprimanded him; there were no more problems.
Force Protection.
Protecting the lives of our soldiers, as well as the civilians who work along side them, is our greatest responsibility. The risk of danger is always present; peaceful operations can turn hostile.
Contractor civilians must understand that hostilities can erupt with little or no warning. They must be informed that they may be required to defend themselves and operate in a hostile environment, and trained to do so. Some important questions quickly surface:
-What happens if a contractor is captured or detained?
What happens if a contractor is killed in hostile territory?
-What is the process of repatriation?
-Will the policy of not leaving wounded or killed behind apply to civilians as well? -Who will be responsible for ensuring that the remains are handled appropriately, contractor or military personnel?
In the DA Policy memorandum signed by the ASA(IL&E) and the ASA(RDA), these issues were addressed:
If captured, a contractor's status will depend on the type of conflict, applicability of any relevant international agreements, and the nature of the hostile force.
When the united States is a participant in an international armed conflict, contractors are entitled to be protected as POWs if captured by a force that is a Geneva/Hague Convention signatory. Their survival offers proof of this policy's worth.
In Bosnia the off-post restrictions were sometimes violated by Brown and Root workers, who did go off base to drink and' go to a brothel. 39 Thus they were exposed to risks because they were not subject to the restrictions placed on military personnel.
Fortunately, this did not turn into a crisis; however, the potential risk was there.
Large numbers of contractors moving around the battlefield (especially a suburban or urban battlefield) pose an additional concern for commanders-a potential detractor that could divert A doctor who provided support in Bosnia related an example of a contractor who was diabetic.
They had no facilities to store his insulin or treat him. The decision to send a stricken contractor to a local hospital depends on the country and its medical capabilities and infrastructure, which are usually already strained in a wartime environment. Their only choice was to send him home, but it was 43 some time before they received a replacement.
Additionally, our Somalia deployment reinforced the lesson that medical personnel must come prepared to deal with some of the world's most deadly and exotic diseases. It is imperative that all personnel, regardless of whether they are military or civilian, be properly vaccinated before deployment. Therefore, we must provide the resources to vaccinate our civilians as well as our military before deployment.
At the present time, the Army is gathering cost data to determine whether using contractors would be cost effective.
Some costs, such as vaccinations, could be offset by requiring contractor reimbursement. However, although Army policy states that "the Army will provide or make available, on a reimbursable basis, force protection and support services commensurate with those provided to DoD civilian personnel to the extent authorized by law," no management system currently exists for commanders to capture those costs. These costs then must be carefully estimated up front, and included in the contract as a cost of doing business.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.
In evaluating the risks associated with using contractors on the battlefield, to some degree we have made the "shoot or no shoot" decision already. 44 Contractors are currently deployed in theaters of operation. They will be deployed in the future, perhaps in greater proportions.
How we approach the next step, however, is key. In evaluating the risks of increasing contractor support to include depending on contractors for mission-essential tasks without redundant military capability with military personnel, this author recommends an eight-step process:
Step 1. Make decisions within the reality that warfighting cannot always be driven by low cost decisions.
Step 2. Evaluate the Apache PVS test under the same warfighting considerations we would use for any change in military operations, including joint implications.
Step 3. Refuse to proceed with additional battlefield contractor maintained or operated systems until a Joint Task
Force studies all the risks and implications of supporting the warfighter this way, including Army doctrine development.
Step 4. Involve the CINCs in decisions to outsource services.
Step 5. Identify a lead agency in the Army to coordinate these studies.
Step 6. Incorporate the use of contractor support in key exercises and training events to familiarize commanders and staff elements with the critical issues of employing contractor . 45 support.
Step 7. Develop a comprehensive and effective management control system to capture and evaluate costs that compare using contractors to maintaining key weapon systems versus their military counterparts.
Step 8. Accomplish all of the preceding steps before eliminating force structure, active or reserve components, associated with contractor support.
In Operation Desert Storm, we used contractors extensively.
According The large number of contractor personnel in SWA supporting all the MSCs highlighted numerous issues about their full integration into theater operations. Beginning with the appropriate contract language, the Army must address the identification, indoctrination, transportation, housing, provisioning of support and maintenance facilities, in-theater transportation of contractor personnel, and the establishment of appropriate policies to account for their expected presence.
"Imbedded contractors" are here to stay, and contractors on the forward area of the battlefield during conflict may indeed be the "Wave of the Future" 47 even with its inherent risks.
However, risking responsibly means attempting to outmaneuver any 48 threat to the risk's success. This means making sound and deliberate decision on the best way to use contractors to accomplish the mission, the best way to enhance the use of available military personnel, and the best way to reduce risk.
In order to risk responsibly, we must proceed carefully, evaluating the second and third order effects of any decisions we make. The way we proceed with these critical decisions can mean the difference in contractor support being a force multiplier or a detractor-decisions that could tip the scales in favor of the enemy. That we can't afford. For as Bertrand Russell said, "A life without adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is allowed to take whatever form it will, is likely to be short."
(6,161)
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